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PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A MATTER OF
EVIDENCE?
Haydn Davies*
Anne Richardson Oakes**
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers that aspect of the jurisprudence of
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 that
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) now terms the
“doctrine of appearances.” 1 The doctrine achieved its current
formulation and has specific application in the context of the
national courts’ use of officials whose function it is to act as court
advisors. Such officials now come within the ambit of the Article
6 fair trial prohibitions against bias with chilling consequences for
an increased use of expertise in the courtroom.2 To the extent that
its underlying assumptions reflect more general concerns with the
legitimacy of judicial process which are, broadly speaking,
common to jurisdictions drawing on the heritage of English
common law, the doctrine may simply be seen as a contribution to
what has been termed “public repute discourse”3 by reference to
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1
See Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 at 455–56 (2006).
2
See Anne Richardson Oakes & Haydn Davies, Process, Outcomes and the
Invention of Tradition: The Growing Importance of the Appearance of Judicial
Neutrality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 573, 580 (2011) (noting the difference
between the terms “bias” and “partiality”); see also Anne Richardson Oakes,
Desegregation in Boston: The Lens of the Present and the Lens of the Past,
ANZLH E-JOURNAL, Refereed Paper No. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.anzlhsejournal.auckland.ac.nz/pdfs_2010/Oakes_Desegregation_in_
Boston.pdf.
3
See Fredrick Schumann, “The Appearance of Justice”: Public Justification in
the Legal Relation, 66 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 189, 191 (2008) (arguing that
“public repute discourse” reflects judicial concerns with the way laws and legal
institutions are viewed by the public: “Public repute discourse relates to three
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which courts seek to assert the legitimacy of judicial process, and
is remarkable, if at all, for the unusual nature of its formulation and
the specific or indeed idiosyncratic nature of the nationally-specific
judicial procedures which are its matrix. From this perspective, the
scope for empirical evidence of public confidence in judicial
processes as the determinant of its legitimacy is traditionally
limited. The Court asserts that its concern is not with “actual bias”
or “bias in fact” but with the issue of perceptions, or rather,
apprehensions of the possibility of bias; in the traditional
formulation “justice must not only be done; it must manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done.” 4 This may be termed an
“objective” approach but the “disinterested and impartial observer”
of judicial process is typically invoked to represent the public
interest so that in terms of actual flesh and blood, this person is a
legal fiction. 5 Courts do not generally, if at all, seek out or
commission research findings of this nature and on the occasions
that it is presented to them, their response can be ambivalent.6
Our attention to the formulations of the European Court is
focused on two specific issues. First, we note the contention that
jurisprudence in this area must be responsive to the existence of
what the Court claims is “‘an increased [public] sensitivity’ . . . to
the fair administration of justice.”7 We note that the Court cites no
evidence in support of this claim and its apparently intuitive
perceptions do not resonate with empirical findings to the effect
that public responses to the fairness of judicial process depend less
upon the “appearance of bias” considerations of judicial
general categories of legal issues: (1) judicial impartiality and independence; (2)
participatory procedural rights at trials and at other adjudicative proceedings;
and (3) the misconduct of nonjudicial actors in the legal system--in other words,
lawyers, prosecutors, and police.” Id. at 191).
4
R v. Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy, 1 K.B. 256 at 259(1924) (Lord Hewart
C.J.).
5
See e.g. Porter v. Magill, 2 A.C. 357 at 489 (2001); see also Louis BlomCooper, Bias: Malfunction in Judicial Decision-Making, 2009 P. L. 199, 199.
6
See JUSTIS PROJECT WORKING PAPERS REVIEW OF NEED: INDICATORS OF
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR POLICY ASSESSMENT 151
(Anniina Jokinen et al. eds., 2009).
7
Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 108 (1993).
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formulation and more upon the extent to which individuals
consider that they themselves have been treated with respect.8 We
note secondly that, in some of its Article 6 decisions, whilst
continuing to use its original terminology, the Court has claimed to
extend the ambit of its formulations to encompass not merely the
sensitivities of the public at large, but also those of the actual
subjects of judicial process.9 From this perspective, regardless of
whatever pretensions to “objectivity” the doctrine may originally
have had, these must now be regarded as problematic.
Fundamentally, however, these developments raise the
question of the relationship between judicially articulated norms of
procedural fairness and the empirical findings of social science
research. We now consider the ECtHR’s Article 6 jurisprudence in
this area in the context of two major empirical studies, one
American and one British, which have attempted to identify the
nature of popular attitudes towards the fairness and thus legitimacy
of judicial process. We suggest that while the “objective”
formulations of common law jurisprudence treat these issues as
non-empirical, those of the European Court may be reflective of an
under-rationalized but instinctively-felt desire to bridge a
perceived gap between the traditionally expressed normative
assumptions of procedural fairness discourse and the empiricallyverifiable and indeed verified desire of those who have been
surveyed as participants in the judicial process for procedures that
recognize and are responsive to their human dignity.
We utter a note of caution however. The effect of the
application of the “doctrine of appearances” has been to limit the
use by national courts of court officials whose primary role is to
enhance the efficiency of court procedures.10 We suggest that
8

See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The
Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, TRUST IN
ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 331, 331–56 (Roderick
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
9
See Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 108 (1993); see also Lobo
Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79 at 94 (1997).
10
See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 596–601 (arguing that “whilst the
doctrine is said to rest upon well-established tradition, in terms of its current
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when the doctrine is invoked to invalidate procedures intended to
improve efficiency of judicial decision-making in situations where
there is no empirical evidence to warrant either an assertion of
actual impropriety or the existence of specific or generalized
concern, the Court underestimates the capacity of the public to
make rational assessments concerning basic fairness, to the
detriment of the quality of the outcomes upon which legitimacy in
the eyes of the public must ultimately depend. We suggest that, in
this respect at least, the Court’s formulations should be more
nuanced so that they take account of both the findings of social
research on attitudes to the justice system and the role of effective
outcomes in securing those attitudes.
We contend that a
generalized concern that “justice must be seen to be done” does not
justify a doctrine which institutionalizes suspicion, and which may
in any case be addressing an aspect of the system that is not
necessarily of primary public concern.11 We conclude with the
observation that the fact that the current approach has arisen in the
context of the specific procedures of national courts is both
reflection and indictment of the potential of the democratic
deficiencies surrounding the delineation of fundamental rights in
the Council of Europe to erode the continued support among
signatory states upon which its own legitimacy as an institution
charged with the supranational supervision of human rights will
also depend. We begin with an account of the doctrine, noting
both its origins, which are relatively new,12 and those aspects of its
interpretive jurisprudence that we find problematic.13
I. THE “DOCTRINE OF APPEARANCES”: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
A. The Early Cases: The Importance of Public Confidence

operation it is in fact a new arrival with a disruptive potential.”).
11
See R v. Sussex Justices Ex p. McCarthy, 1 K.B. 256 at 259 (1924) (Lord
Hewart C.J.).
12
See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 576.
13
See GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 58–79 (2007).
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The so-called “doctrine of appearances” began life in the
late 1950s in four decisions of the European Commission of
Human Rights and Committee of Ministers. 14 All four cases
involved Article 6 challenges to the procedures of the Austrian
criminal courts.15 In Ofner and Hopfinger, the Commission and
Committee considered the role of the Generalprokurator of the
Supreme Court of Austria and specifically whether the latter’s
practice of advising the Court’s Rapporteur on a plea of nullity,
where that advice was given and the decision reached in the
14

See Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, and Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No.
617/59, 78, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1962); see also Pataki v. Austria, App. No.
596/59, and Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No. 789/60, 49, Eur. Comm’n H.R.
(1963).
15
The full text of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Freedoms (1950) (right to a fair trial) reads as
follows:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public
order or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights: a) to be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him; b) to have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his defense; c) to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require; d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
1950, Art. 6.
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absence of the defendant’s counsel, contravened the principle of
“equality of arms” which was said to be “an inherent element of a
‘fair trial’” protected by Article 6. 16 In the context of the Austrian
criminal code as a whole, and in the particular circumstances of
these cases, the Commission was able to conclude that no
inequality existed in the position of the parties.17 In Pataki and
Dunshirn, however, Article 6 challenges were sustained where, on
an appeal against sentence and despite the potential for the
outcome to adversely affect the defendants’ position, the Chief
Public Prosecutor addressed the Court in private but the defendants
themselves were afforded no opportunity to be heard.18 Observing
that Article 6 did not define the notion of a fair trial in a criminal
case, the Commission adopted an expansive approach; the
Article’s provisions were not to be interpreted restrictively and a
trial could fail to meet the required standard of fairness even
though the “minimum rights” guaranteed by paragraphs 3 and 2
had been respected.19 Specifically, the Commission asserted that
“it is beyond doubt that the wider and general provision of a fair
trial, contained in paragraph (1) of Article 6, embodies the notion
‘equality of arms.’”20
In these early decisions, the basis of the “objective” and
“subjective” tests of impartiality or bias which later become the
“doctrine of appearances” is already discernible. In Pataki and
Dunshirn, although the precise term is not used, the Commission
recognized the importance of external perceptions. Conceding that
16

Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, and Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No.
617/59, 78, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1962).
17
See id.
18
See Pataki v. Austria, App. No. 596/59, and Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No.
789/60, 50, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1963) (explaining that regardless of whether the
Public Prosecutor actually influenced the court, the fact that there was a chance
of influence meant the trial was not fair); cf. Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59,
and Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No. 617/59, 84, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1962).
19
See id. (citing Nielsen v. Denmark, App. No. 343/57, 79, Eur. Comm’n H.R.
(1960)).
20
See id.; see also JOSEPH M. JACOB, CIVIL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 9 (2007) (explaining that the term “equality of arms” is “more familiar in
civilian jurisprudence than in the common law […]” and is “an omnibus term
embracing a number of separate rights” of a disparate nature arising in
connection with issues of access to the courts and the right to be heard).
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the absence of any record of the national court’s deliberations
would preclude a definitive decision concerning the Public
Prosecutor’s actual role, the fact of his physical presence was
crucial; the Commission could not ignore the potential effect on
the public perception:
Even on the assumption […] that the Public Prosecutor did not
play an active role at this stage of the proceedings, the very
fact that he was present and thereby had an opportunity of
influencing the members of the court, without the accused or
his counsel having any similar opportunity or any possibility
of contesting any statements made by the Prosecutor,
constitutes an inequality which, in the opinion of the
Commission, is incompatible with the notion of a fair trial.21

In this methodology, “objective” analysis operates as a fallback position. If potential inequality is to be equated with actual
inequality then, despite the absence of evidence of actual
“subjective” bias on the part of the decision-makers, the court must
err on the side of caution and a decision of incompatibility will
ensue.
These Commission decisions are cited some seven years
later in an Article 6 challenge to the procedures of the Court of
Cassation in Belgium, specifically the role of representatives of the
Procureur Général’s (PG) Department.22 Delcourt v. Belgium23—
another criminal case—was the first of several such challenges to
the Belgian criminal and civil appeals system that were to follow
in subsequent years. 24 The PG’s department is a multi-level
21

See Pataki v. Austria, App. No. 596/59, and Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No.
789/60, 50, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1963) (arguing that the mere fact that the Public
Prosecutor was present at the proceedings meant that he had a chance to
persuade the members of the court).
22
Article 6(1) does play a part in the earlier decision of Neumeister v. Austria
but the court decided that Article 6(1) was not engaged in requests for
provisional release from incarceration. See Neumeister v. Austria, 1 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 91 at 132 (1968).
Elsewhere, Article 6(1) is invoked, though
unsuccessfully, in the context of the timeliness aspect of a fair trial rather than
partiality or equality. See id. at 130–31 (1988).
23
See Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (1970) (recognizing an
allegation of violation of Article 6(1) when a department member appeared in
the Court of Cassation).
24
Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 95–96 (1993); De Cubber v.
Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236 at 245 (1985); Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R.
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organization, which role and personnel differ between the lower
courts and the Court of Cassation.25 In the latter, the representative
of the PG’s department acts as an advisor to the court in a manner
analogous to that of the Advocate General (AdvG) of the European
Court of Justice with one crucial difference: the PG representative
retires with the judges during their deliberations, whereas the
AdvG does not. 26 Notwithstanding this fact, the ECtHR in
Delcourt found that the PG was not “one of the parties” and thus
the doctrine of “equality of arms” did not obtain between Mr
Delcourt and the PG.27 However, the Court made an allusion to
appearances in similar, though stronger language, to that used
previously by the Commission in Pataki and Dunshirn v. Austria.28
Noting that the PG’s representative might well appear as an
“adversary” to defendants (as opposed to legal cognoscenti),29 the
Court continued:
The preceding considerations are of a certain importance
which must not be underestimated. If one refers to the dictum
‘justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be
done’, these considerations may allow doubts to arise about
the satisfactory nature of the system in dispute.30

Here, the word “appearances” makes its debut together
Rep. 169 at 177 (1983); Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 at 75
(1997); Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 at 317 (1996).
25
See Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 97 (1993) (quoting Article
414 of the Judicial Code and noting the duties a PG has when at the Court of
Appeals and the Court of Cassation).
26
See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism, 25
MICH. J. INT’L L. 879, 884−85 (2004) (noting the AdvG’s duties with regard to
the courts); see also Mitchel de S.-O.-I’E. Lasser, The European Pasteurization
of French Law, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1016 (2005) (recognizing the PG’s
duty at the Court of Cassation as that of an advisor); see also Cyril Ritter, A New
Look at the Role and Impact of Advocates-General—Collectively and
Individually, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 751, 757 (2006) (establishing that Advocates
General do not take part in judicial deliberations).
27
Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 at 370−71 (1970).
28
Id. at 369.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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with the paraphrase of the remarks of Lord Hewart C.J. in the
English case of R v. Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy, although the
origin is not cited.31 “Looking behind appearances,” however, the
Court, clearly reluctant to be seen to be interfering with a longestablished legal procedure which “appears never to have been put
in question by the legal profession or public opinion in Belgium,”
was not prepared on this occasion to find a violation of the right to
a fair hearing.32
This reluctance will continue to characterize later decisions
related to judicial bias or “equality of arms” where the propriety of
the institutions of national legal systems themselves are under
scrutiny as opposed to the role of individual legal officials. 33
Even here, as the Court has made clear, impartiality should be
presumed “until there is proof to the contrary.” 34 We return to this
point later.
The next important case to come before the Court also
involved the Belgian criminal justice system. In Piersack v.
Belgium, a judge who had previously acted against the defendant
as a public prosecutor was subsequently elevated to the Belgian
Court of Appeal where he heard an appeal from the defendant,
eventually decided on a seven to five majority.35 The ECtHR,
whilst taking pains not to impugn the judge’s personal integrity,
nevertheless found an Article 6 violation:36

31

R v. Sussex Justices Ex p. McCarthy, 1 K.B. 256 at 259 (1924) (Lord Hewart
C.J.).
32
Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 at 371 (1970).
33
See Kress v. France [GC], App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 at ¶
81 (unreported) (concluding that the presence at the deliberations of the Conseil
d’Etat of the Government Commissioner compromised the apparent neutrality of
the proceedings for “a litigant not familiar with the mysteries of the
proceedings”); see also Kress v. France, 12 HUM. RTS. CASE DIG. 357, 358
(2001) (pointing out that in Kress v. France, the applicant made an appeal
because she was unaware that the Government Commissioner would submit
evidence or make an appearance at the trial).
34
LeCompte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 at 21
(1981).
35
Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169 at 170–71(1983).
36
Id. at 180.
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However, it is not possible to confine oneself to a purely
subjective test. In this area, even appearances may be of a
certain importance. … any judge in respect of whom there is a
legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw.
What is at stake is the confidence which the courts must
inspire in the public in a democratic society.37

Here the doctrine starts to assume its modern shape and the
phrases emphasized above appear virtually verbatim (though
sometimes extended) in several subsequent judgments (including
Sramek v. Austria (1985);38 De Cubber v. Belgium (1985);39 Belios
v. Switzerland (1988);40 Hauschildt v. Austria (1988)41). By the
time we arrive at Borgers v. Belgium in 1993,42 the doctrine is
starting to become acknowledged as such:
the . . . concept of a fair trial . . . has undergone considerable
evolution in the Court’s case law, notably in respect of the
importance attached to appearances and to the increased
sensitivity of the public to the fair administration of justice.43

The doctrine continues to develop throughout the 1990s
and gradually widens into a two-pronged subjective/objective
formula appearing mutatis mutandis,44 whenever issues concerning
the impartiality of tribunals or “equality of arms” arise, and in its
latest outing before the Grand Chamber in 2010 in the following
form:
According to the Court’s constant case-law, the existence of
impartiality for the purposes of Article 6§1 must be
determined according to a subjective test where regard must
be had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a
37

Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169, at ¶ 30 (1983) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
38
Sramek v. Austria, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 351, at ¶ 42 (1985).
39
De Cubber v. Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, at ¶ 26 (1985).
40
Belilos v. Switzerland, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 466, at ¶ 67 (1988).
41
Hauschildt v. Denmark, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, at ¶ 48 (1990).
42
See generally Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993).
43
Id.
44
Id.
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particular judge, that is, whether the judge held any personal
prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an
objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the
tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition,
offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt
in respect of its impartiality.45

....
. . . In this respect even appearances may be of a certain
importance or, in other words, “justice must not only be
done, it must also be seen to be done.” What is at stake is the
confidence which the courts in a democratic society must
inspire in the public . . . .46

B. From Public to Personal Sensitivity: Objectivity and
Subjectivity in the Court’s Terminology
The effect of these developments has not been universally
welcomed. Specifically, the assertion of an “increased sensitivity
of the public” has attracted criticism from commissioners,47 and
judges alike,48 and we return to these matters shortly. At this
point, we draw attention to a problem of terminology. In the
formulations we have examined so far, the Court has employed the
language of subjectivity to refer to actual bias or
inappropriate/impermissible predisposition which is independently
or objectively verifiable, and the language of objectivity to refer to
the “legitimate doubt[s]” of the projected observations of the

45

Micallef v. Malta (No. 6), 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, at ¶ 93 (2010).
Id.
47
Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79, at ¶ 29 (1997)
(Commissioners Treschel, Schermers, Martinez, Geus, Pellonpaa, Cabral
Barreto, Bratza, Konstantinov & Svaby).
48
See Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at 114, 127 (1993) (Marten &
Storme, JJ. dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new doctrine is ambiguous and
that it may only be limited to criminal cases); see also Kress v. France [GC],
App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (unreported) (Wildhaber, Costa,
Pastor Ridruejo, Kuris, Birsan, Botoucharova & Ugrekhelidze JJ., dissenting);
see also Ocalan v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, at 1055 (2005) (Costa,
Calflisch, Turmen, Garlicki & Borrego Borrego, JJ. dissenting).
46
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public observer. 49 From the point of view of its dictionary
definition, the choice of terminology here is unusual and possibly
counterintuitive; “objectivity” generally refers to that which is
capable of independent verification, i.e., it carries with it a
connotation of empirical truth. 50 Nevertheless, in the specific
context as we have described it, the meaning is clear; fairness is as
much a matter of appearance as of substance and the purpose of the
formulation may be described as “prophylactic” in the sense that it
is directed towards ensuring that impropriety in fact does not
occur.51 In this, the Court’s jurisprudence is in line with that of
other common law jurisdictions which target “appearances” from
the perspective of the public as represented by the fiction of the
disinterested, i.e., uninvolved, and dispassionate observer. 52
Various jurisdictions have struggled to describe such a person but
the point we stress here is that s/he (and it usually does not matter
which) is not an individuated conceptualization of a real living
person with the full range of human emotions but rather a
generically conceived representation whose function is to occupy
the role of “the public” to whom the Court’s concerns are directed.
In its subsequent jurisprudence which we examine next,
however, the terminology of the ECtHR undergoes a change of
emphasis so that its focus is extended beyond that of “the public”
49

Micallef v. Malta (No. 6), 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, at ¶ 93 (2010).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “objective” as
“of, relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an
individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions” and “without bias or prejudice;
disinterested”).
51
See Deborah Hellman, Symposium, Judging by Appearances: Professional
Ethics, Expressive Government, and the Moral Significance of How Things
Seem, 60 MD. L. REV. 653, 653–54 (2001) (describing “‘appearance of
impropriety’ standards for public officials and professionals” as “prophylactic”
in character but as she points out the mischief of the test is directed towards
prevention of public mistake: “appearance of wrongdoing prohibitions address
instances where the observer mistakes the true nature of the action” so that in
ethical terms, as Andrew Stark argues, the use of the term needs care); see also
ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 25–26
(2000) (pointing out that in contrast to “conflict of interest” prohibitions, an
“appearance of bias” test ought not properly be described as “prophylactic” in
the sense that the appearance itself constitutes the impropriety to be avoided).
52
See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 575.
50
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at large to encompass the perceptions of the actual individuals who
are the subjects of the judicial process in question. 53 The
development occurs in connection with the requirement of
“equality of arms” and begins in the case of De Cubber v.
Belgium—a criminal case where an appeal judge had already acted
in a different capacity in previous hearings. 54 The judgment
reiterates the by now standard “appearances” formula but then
goes further:
any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to
fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw. What is at stake is
the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must
inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal
proceedings are concerned, in the accused.55

Despite the fact that Piersack v. Belgium is cited as
authority,56 the italicized words of the extract above do not in fact
appear in the Piersack judgment and seem to have arisen de novo
in De Cubber. No justification for the extended formulation was
given but it has nevertheless been used in a number of subsequent
cases involving criminal charges,57 and became the principal issue
in connection with the Belgian office of the Procureur Général in
Borgers v. Belgium where once again the cited authority was
weak.58
53

Micallef v. Malta (No. 6), Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, at ¶ 98 (2010).
De Cubber v. Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, at 237 (1985).
55
Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
56
Id. (citing Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep 169, at 179 (1983)).
57
See Hauschildt v. Denmark, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, at 279 (1990); see also
Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at 398 (1993); Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 44
Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, at 594 (2007).
58
See generally Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993) (citing to a list
of cases it claimed applied to cases involving “equality of arms” (Piersack v.
Belgium; Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom; Sramek v. Austria; De
Cubber v. Belgium; Bönisch v. Austria; Belilos v. Switzerland; Hauschildt v.
Denmark; Langborger v. Sweden; Demicoli v. Malta; Brandstetter v. Austria).
Of these, however, only two were on point: Piersack, De Cubber and Hauschildt
all involved judges acting in a prior capacity; Campbell and Fell, Demicoli and
Belios involved tribunals said to lack sufficient independence or impartiality;
Sramek, Langerborger and Brandstetter involved tribunal members with
54
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As we suggested earlier, the emphasis on the specific
perspective of the accused represents a considerable expansion of
the doctrine. Confusingly, the Borgers Court also concluded that
“the official of the Procureur-Général’s department becomes
objectively speaking [the accused’s] ally or his opponent.”59 We
make two comments. The first concerns terminology. As we
noted earlier the use of the term “objective” generally connotes
that which is independently verifiable. The Borgers use, however,
connotes the more commonly termed dispassionate (but fictitious)
observer of common law “appearance” jurisprudence; the
implication is that any independent person would reach the same
conclusion. And so they might, if they were in the accused
position. It hardly bears saying that the accused’s viewpoint,
whilst it is certainly empirically verifiable in the sense that it is
ascertainable, in terms of position, would not normally be
described as “objective.” An accused person who regards a court
advisor or official giving an adverse opinion as an opponent, and
one who gives a favourable opinion as an ally reaches this
conclusion “subjectively,” and understandably, on the basis of their
own interests. If the reference to “objectivity” connotes that which
is independently verifiable, a doctrine which requires deference to
the (perceived) sensitivities of the public has evolved in this
element at least, into deference to a perception that is empirically
verifiable but inherently not “objective.” On the assumption that
the reference to an “objective” perspective connotes the more
familiar reasonable observer of “appearance jurisprudence,” if the
fairness of proceedings must now be judged by reference to the
perspectives of both the wider public at large and the individuals
concerned, it is by no means clear that the two will necessarily
coincide. It is perfectly possible that an informed and truly
independent observer representing the public interest, might,
potential conflicts of interest; and Bonisch involved a tribunal member whose
previous report had led to the prosecution in the first place. Of these only
Brandstetter and Bonisch were decided on the basis of the “equality of arms”—
the principal issue in Borgers.
59
Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at 108 (1993).
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“objectively” see no problem with the role of the representative of
the PG in the Court of Cassation, provided sufficient safeguards
are seen to exist, even if that representative’s independent
assessment of the case is adverse to the interests of the accused.
Our second point concerns what we might term “contextual
fluidity.” As we noted earlier, the European Court has demarcated
the general principle of the fairness of proceedings in accordance
with the subcategories of Article 6(1) to include timeliness,
absence of a public hearing, independence, impartiality and
“equality of arms.”60 In some cases, these categories are permitted
to overlap,61 so that the “appearances” analysis as formulated in
Borgers has expanded beyond the criminal law to encompass the
procedure of civil, 62 and military tribunals, 63 even where these
have been adjudged to involve questions of impartiality or
independence rather than “equality of arms” per se. In others, the
Court makes a clear, but as we suggest below, possibly
instrumental distinction between them. Thus, in Borgers, although
the Court found a contravention of the principle of “equality of
arms,”64 it noted that “the findings in the Delcourt judgment on the
question of the independence and impartiality of the Court of
Cassation and its Procureur Général’s department remain entirely
valid.”65
The effect is that since Borgers the “doctrine of
appearances” now has an element of unpredictability depending on
which aspect of the alleged unfairness of proceedings is at issue.
In cases involving the alleged partiality of judges, tribunal
60

See Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights Art. 6, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22.
61
See generally Lobos Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79 (1997).
62
See Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997); see also Kress v.
France [GC], App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (unreported); see also
Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2001) see also Morel v. France,
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47, (2001); see also Yvon v. France, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41
(2005); see also Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep.15 (2007).
63
See e.g., Incal v. Turkey, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449 (2000); Castillo Algar v.
Spain, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 827 (2000); Morris v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 52 (2002); Cooper v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2004).
64
Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at ¶ 29 (1993).
65
Id. at ¶ 24.
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members and jurors it seems that the Court generally requires
analysis of “objective,” in the sense of independently verifiable,
factors that might amount to “sufficient safeguards” of the
applicant's Article 6(1) rights.66 And even here, post-Borgers,
more attention seems to have been devoted to “looking behind the
appearances” in cases where the impartiality of jurors is in
question67 than in cases involving tribunal members or judges. 68
However, where “equality of arms” is concerned, appearances in
the eyes of the applicant alone seem to be enough to render the
proceedings in violation of the safeguards offered by Article 6(1)
with no requirement of analysis of “objective” supporting
evidence; the crucial factor seems to be the accused’s perception of
who is “objectively speaking,” his or her ally or opponent.69
The emphasis in cases involving juror bias or allegations of
partiality on the part of tribunal members or judges on a
requirement for evidence of actual impropriety has led some
judges to question the continued role of “appearances” in “equality
of arms” cases.70 In 1997, Judge Storme in Van Orshoven v.
Belgium,71 a case similar to Borgers, suggested in his dissenting
opinion that the Court in its recent case law “appeared to have
abandoned . . . the principle of outward appearances.”72 If this had
occurred, as we now point out, it must have done so in a series of
eleven cases between Borgers in 1991 and Van Orshoven in
1998. 73 Of these cases Fey, Nortier, Diennet, Ferrantelli &
66

See Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at ¶¶ 28 & 30 (1993); see also
Nortier v. Netherlands, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273, at ¶ 33 (1994); see also Remli v.
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253, at 46 (1996); see also Pullar v. United Kingdom,
22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391, at ¶¶ 38 & 39 (1996).
67
Pullar v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391(1996); see also Remli v.
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253 (1996).
68
Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 (2007); Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32
Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, at 314 (2001); Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
69
Kress v. France [GC], App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at ¶82.
70
Remli v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253 at 271 (1996); Pullar v. United
Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391, at 399–400 (1996); Nortier v Netherlands, 17
Eur. H.R. Rep. 273, at 289 (1994); Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at
397–98 (1993).
71
Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997).
72
Id. at 79.
73
See Bulut v. Austria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 84 (1997); Ferrantelli & Santangelo v.
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Santangelo and Thomann involved allegations of partiality on the
part of tribunal members or judges, Pullar and Remli concerned
allegations of juror bias, and only Lobos Machado, Bulut and
Mantovanelli related to “equality of arms.” 74 Whilst the
suggestion was certainly tenable in the bias /partiality cases,75 the
“equality of arms” cases generally maintain the reliance on
“appearances” first advocated in Borgers.
Thus in Lobo
Machados, the court commented on the presence of the Deputy
Attorney-General of Portugal at a private sitting of the Portuguese
Supreme Court, to the effect that:
Even if he had no kind of say, whether advisory or any other,
it afforded him, if only to outward appearances, an additional
opportunity to bolster his Opinion in private, without fear of
contradiction.76

Again in Bulut, in reference to the Attorney-General’s submissions
to the Supreme Court of Austria, the Court recalled that:
under the principle of equality of arms, as one of the features
of the wider concept of a fair trial, each party must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under
conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis
his opponent. In this context, importance is attached to
appearances as well as to the increased sensitivity to the fair
administration of justice.77

Italy, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288 (1997); Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79
(1997); Mantovanelli v. France, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 370 (1997); Thomman v.
Switzerland, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553(1997); Diennet v. France, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep.
554 (1996); Pullar v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391 (1996); Remli v.
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253 (1996); Beaumartin v. France 19 Eur. H.R. Rep.
485 (1995); Nortier v. Netherlands, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273 (1994); Fey v.
Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387 (1993).
74
Mantovanelli v. France, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 370, at ¶ 30 (1997) (differing
partially because ‘equality of arms’ was only one part of the alleged violation of
the adversarial principle).
75
See e.g. Pullar v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391, at 399–400 (1996);
see also Remli v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253, at 271 (1996); see also Nortier
v. Netherlands, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273, at 289 (1994); see also Fey v. Austria, 16
Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at 397–98 (1993) (providing examples of bias and partiality
cases in which the principle of outward appearances could have been considered
abandoned).
76
Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79, at 98 (1997) (emphasis added).
77
Bulut v. Austria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 84, at 103–04 (1997) (emphasis added).
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Thus, if the “principle of outward appearances” had been
abandoned, this was not apparent to any noticeable degree in
“equality of arms” cases up to and including Van Orshoven.78
Moreover, subsequent cases of this kind seem to rely on outward
appearances with an enthusiasm at least as buoyant as in Borgers
itself.79 In any event, by the time we get to the Kress judgment,80
in 2001 the ECtHR has certainly (re-)embraced the controlling
importance of outward appearances:
It is for this reason that the Court has held that regardless of
the acknowledged objectivity of the Advocate-General or his
equivalent, that officer, in recommending that an appeal on
points of law should be allowed or dismissed, became
objectively speaking the ally or opponent of one of the parties
and that his presence at the deliberations afforded him, if only
to outward appearances, an additional opportunity to bolster
his submissions in private, without fear of contradiction.81

In 2006, however, in Martinie v. France,82 the Grand Chamber of
the ECtHR left little doubt that, where the principle of “equality of
arms” is at stake, appearances are controlling so that “the mere
presence” at deliberations of the Government Commissioner (and
by extension of Procureurs General, Conseils d’Etat, Advocates
General or law officers performing similar functions),83 whether
this be “active” or “passive,” constituted an Article 6 violation.84
C. Appearances and the CJEU
The principle of “equality of arms” as applied in Borgers
has particular resonance for the procedures of national courts that
retain elements of Roman law practice and employ the institution
of the Advocate General or its equivalent as an advisor to its courts
of appeal or cassation.85 We commented earlier on the expressed
78

Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997).
See Vermuelen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, at 31 (2001).
80
Kress v. France [GC], App. No. 39594/98 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
81
Id. at ¶ 82.
82
Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, at 434 (2006).
83
Of particular significance in Belgium, France and Portugal.
84
Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, at 456 (2006).
85
See dissenting judgment of Gölcüklü, Matscher and Pettiti JJ. in Vermeulen v.
Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep.15 (1996) and dissenting judgements of Pettiti and
Storme JJ. in Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997).
79
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reluctance of the ECtHR to impugn on Article 6 grounds the
integrity of national judicial institutions in the absence of any
suggestion of actual impropriety on the part of individual
officials. 86 We pause here to note a similar tension in the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU, formerly the European Court of Justice or the ECJ).
The procedures of the CJEU are quite closely modelled on
those of the French and Belgian appellate court systems. The role
of the Advocate General (AdvG) in particular resembles that of the
Advocat Général of the French Court of Cassation 87 or the
representative of the Procureur Général’s department in the
Belgian Court of Cassation. In 2000, Emesa Sugar N.V. invoked
the “doctrine of appearances,” as it had been applied by the ECtHR
in Vermeulen v. Belgium,88 against the ECJ’s refusal to permit the
company to submit observations on a preliminary adverse ruling of
the AdvG,89 contending that this constituted an infringement of its
Article 6 rights. 90 Finding against Emesa Sugar, the Court
distinguished the modus operandi of its own AdvG from that of the
Belgian equivalent on two related grounds concerning the origin of
the authority: (i) unlike the Belgian official, Advocates General of
the ECJ are members of the court, appointed in the same way as
the judges, “are not public prosecutors nor are they subject to any
[external] authority,” 91 and (ii) the opinion of the Advocate
General is not an “opinion addressed to the judges or to the
parties which stems from an authority outside the Court or which
derives its authority from that of the Procureur Général's
department” so it “does not form part of the proceedings between
the parties, but rather opens the stage of deliberation by the

86

See supra text accompanying notes 31–33.
See MITCHEL DE S.- O.-L’E LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 113
(2004).
88
Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1996).
89
Case C-17/98, President of Arrondissementsrechtbank te 's-Gravenhage v.
Emesa Sugar, 2000 E.C.R. I00665.
90
See generally MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES 63,
110 (2006).
91
Case C-17/98, Emesa Sugar v. Aruba, 2000 E.C.R. I-00665, at ¶12.
87
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Court.”92 It followed then that “the ... case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights [is] not [] transposable to the Opinion of
the Court's Advocates General.”93
However, none of the arguments put forward by the ECJ
addressed the underlying rationale of the doctrine at issue in
Vermeulen, to the effect that the applicant would view the
Advocate General (“objectively speaking”) as an opponent. 94 The
Emesa decision was predicated on the difference in the status of
the representative of the PG’s department in the Belgian Court and
that of the AdvG in the ECJ,95 but what seems to matter in ECtHR
analysis is not the source of the authority but what that authority is
directed towards and to whom or what these officers owe their
commitment. In Vermeulen, the ECtHR was at pains to point out
that the official’s actual independence was not at issue and that
previous findings on the independence of the department
“remained wholly valid.”96 The principal reason for the finding
was the contention that the applicant would view the representative
of the PG’s department as an opponent (or ally).97 In the same
way, it was open to the ECJ to conclude that from the “standpoint
of the accused” an applicant on the receiving end of an
unfavourable opinion from its AdvG might view that official as an
opponent irrespective of the origins and nature of the
appointment.98 Nevertheless, the ECJ preferred to satisfy itself
concerning its Article 6 compliance on the basis of the “actual”
independence of the AdvG.99 Given the potential consequences,
92

Id. at ¶ 14.
Id. at 16.
94
Id. at 26.
95
See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism, 25
MICH. J. INT’L L. 879, 885 (2004) (reporting that the AdvG’s decision is not an
opinion to judges from an outside authority, such as the PG, but an individual
reasoned opinion of a member of the Court); see, e.g., Mariles Desomer, Case
Law: Emesa Sugar, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 127, 131 (2001) (explaining that the
AdvG, while being a neutral advisory party, gives a suggestion after the parties
have finished submissions and before the judges have made a decision).
96
See Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, at ¶ 30 (2001).
97
Id. at ¶ 33.
98
See, e.g., Koch, supra note 95, at 885–86.
99
See generally William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25
93
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this is perhaps not surprising; these officials are appointed not to
uphold the interests of the state or institution that employed them,
but to ensure the quality and consistency of the legal process and
decision-making.100 Engagement with the “applicant’s point of
view” would presumably have required reform of the institution of
the AdvG in the same way that has been necessary in Belgium and
France.101
We have commented elsewhere on the implications of these
developments for the efficiency of judicial decision-making and
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 974 (2004).
100
See Article 13, Protocol (No 3) On the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Union, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010).
101
The French reaction to the Kress (and Martinie) decisions was a decree
incorporating a new procedure . . . adding Article R. 731-7 to the Administrative
Courts Code to the effect that “the Government Commissioner shall be present
at deliberations; he shall not participate in them.” See Decree No. 2005-1586 of
19 December 2005, in Revue Francaise de Droit Aministratif 2006, 298–9. The
Belgian response is explained in Wynen v Belgium, 32576/96, 5/11/2002)[26]
explaining the reforms in 2000 to the Belgian judicial code:
A law of 14 November 2000, which came into force on 29
December 2000, amended Article 1107 of the Judicial Code as
follows:
“After the report has been read out, Principal State
Counsel’s Office shall make its submissions. Submissions
shall then be heard from the parties. Their addresses shall
relate exclusively to the issues of law raised in the grounds of
appeal or to objections to the admissibility of the appeal or of
particular grounds.
Where the submissions of Principal State Counsel’s
Office are in writing, the parties may, at the very latest during
the hearing and solely in reply to those submissions, submit a
memorandum in which they may not raise any new grounds of
appeal. At the hearing each party may seek an adjournment in
order to reply orally or by means of a memorandum to the
written or oral submissions of Principal State Counsel’s
Office. The Court shall fix the time-limit for submitting the
memorandum.”’
For changes to the Portugese system resulting from “appearances jurisprudence”
see Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Les Effets de la Jurisprudence de la Cour
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme sur l’Ordre Juridique et Judiciaire
Portugais, in LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER, 81 (Lucius Calfisch et al.
eds. 2007).
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have noted the chilling effect in the U.K., at least for the increased
use of technical assistants which Lord Woolf’s civil procedure
reforms originally envisaged.102 We return to these matters later
but turn now to the concern that drives the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR in these matters, namely the asserted existence of an
“increased sensitivity” on the part of the public, a sensitivity that
we claim owes more to the imagination of the European Court than
to anything in the way of hard evidence. In the next section we
consider the extent to which judicial norms of procedural fairness
require support from, or at least a connection to, an empirical
foundation.
II. APPEARANCES IN LEGITIMACY ASSESSMENTS: A NORMATIVE OR
EMPIRICAL QUESTION?
When the European Court asserts a need to connect with
matters of public confidence, it invokes a tradition of liberal
discourse in which the boundaries, limits, and values of judicial
procedure are conceptualized in terms of legitimacy.103 Within this
tradition, what is required is the proper separation of the judicial
function from the other functions of government and observance of
“due process” which sees justice as the consistent application of
rules by means of adjudicative procedures reflecting principles of
neutrality and participation.104 As we have suggested, at one level
and despite some eccentricities of expression, we can locate the
European Court’s “doctrine of appearances” within this type of
discourse so that when the European Court uses the language of
objectivity we can understand that it is referring to perspective and
that the term connotes the disinterested, in the sense of
dispassionate observer well-known to common law jurisprudence.
102

See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 598–601.
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 120 (Peter Laslett ed.
1960); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (John
Gray ed. 1998).
104
The so-called rules of natural justice: nemo iudex in causa sua potest (no-one
can be judge in their own cause) and audi alteram partem (hear both sides). See
generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE (1979).
103
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In this context, as has been pointed out, “[t]he reasonable observer
of the judicial system . . . is a normative idealization rather than a
straightforward reading of public attitudes and behaviour.”105 The
criteria which govern the fairness of judicial process are often said
to be self-reflexive, i.e, the court holds up the mirror to find the
reflection of its own experience.106
However, as Beetham points out, there is another, and
separate, body of social science literature which draws on Max
Weber to define legitimacy as a matter of empirically verifiable
social inquiry; in Weberian terms legitimacy is a function of
“Legitimitaetsglaube” or belief in legitimacy, so that legitimate
power is that which is popularly regarded as legitimate or “als
legitim angesehen.” 107 In Tyler’s (contemporary) formulation,
legitimacy is located in “the belief that authorities, institutions, and
social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just.”108 Social
scientists agree that the issue of legitimacy goes to the heart of the
law’s authority and that judicial rulings or decisions can be
accepted by citizens even though they might dislike or disagree
with them, provided that they recognize the legitimacy of the
institutions from which they come.109 They support the view that
fair institutional procedures foster internalized compliance and
stress the importance of appearance; citizen acceptance of
institutional legitimacy depends in large measure on the extent to
which the procedures of the institution or decision-making body
are perceived to be procedurally fair.110 However, their empirical
105

Schumann, supra note 3 at 203.
Id. at 201–02.
107
DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 8 (1991) (discussing and
quoting from MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 23, 157 (J.C.B.
Mohr ed., 1956) and MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN (J.C.
B. Mohr ed., 1958).
108
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 376, 376 (2006) (hereinafter “Psychological
Perspectives”).
109
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (2006); Tyler,
Psychological Perspectives supra note 108, at 379.
110
See TOM R. TYLER, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What
Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal
Authorities?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 233 (2001); TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
106
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studies concerning the factors that influence these perceptions and
the weight that they carry when balanced against other
considerations, notably those of efficiency and effectiveness,
disclose a picture that is much more nuanced than is typical of
judicial discourse.
As Beetham has commented: “[i]t is one of the most
remarkable features about the study of legitimacy that it is
suspended between two separate bodies of literature that have
absolutely no connection with each other.”111 We now consider
the European Court’s assertions in the context of the empirical
findings of two major pieces of social science research concerning
the nature and formation of public attitudes towards the fairness
and efficiency of judicial proceedings.
A. The ‘Increased Sensitivity of the Public’: Intuition versus
Evidence
Arguably, the whole edifice of the doctrine, perhaps since
the Delcourt decision and certainly since Borgers, rests on the
contention that the public is increasingly sensitive to the fair
administration of justice.112 Given the centrality of Article 6 rights
to the administration of justice throughout the states of the Council
of Europe, and the significant effect that the ruling was likely to
have on the legal systems in those states, we consider it to be
remarkable that in our review of 69 cases involving Article 6
impartiality, independence or equality of arms, decided between
1963 and 2010, we find not one piece of empirical evidence put
forward either to or by the Court to support this proposition. In
Borgers itself Judge Martens’ dissent made exactly this point:113
THE LAW, supra note 109 (finding that the public’s evaluations of the police and
courts are linked primarily to whether individuals perceive these systems to be
procedurally fair).
111
Beetham, supra note 107, at 7.
112

Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (1970); Borgers v. Belgium, 1
Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993) (effectively reversing Delcourt despite almost
identical facts).
113
It must be noted that Judge Martens is himself Belgian and thus
“appearances” may be against him in respect of the impartiality of his dissent.
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The point made by the Court suggests that since the Delcourt
judgment there have been “societal changes” in this respect
which warrant overruling. Thus it echoes a similar
observation made during the hearing before the Court by
counsel for the applicant. Counsel provided no specific
grounds for his suggestion that since the Delcourt judgment
there had been an evolution in this respect. Neither does the
Court. It merely refers to its case-law . . . but there one will
look in vain for a factual basis for the alleged “increased
sensitivity of the public.”
Yet, general allegations such as this require a proper basis
in fact. While the legal profession in various member States
undoubtedly shows an increased awareness of the
possibilities offered by the Convention, this should not be
confounded with “societal changes” which eventually may
entail - and justify - changing the Court’s case-law!
For my part, I am not aware of any specific grounds for the
Court’s thesis.114

In all the Article 6 cases we have studied, the only allusion
we have been able to find to any evidence of this alleged increase
in sensitivity is a comment made by the Commission in Borgers
itself responding to the Belgian government’s argument that “the
[Procureur General] system has been in existence for more than
150 years and has operated without a break and without any public
opposition whatever.”115 The Commission dismissed that argument
as follows: “[w]ith regard to this the Commission would note that
This possibility is a particularly important one to consider in the light of Erik
Voeten’s findings in relation to the judges of the ECHR when ruling in cases
where their own country is a party. See Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of
International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417 (2008). However, there is some “objective
evidence” in Judge Martens’ favor in that he has delivered dissenting opinions
along the same lines in Langborger v. Sweden, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 416, at 431
(1990) and Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at 403 (1993).
114

Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at 129 (1993) (Martens, J.,
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115
Id. at 105.
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it has heard criticisms of the system on a number of occasions.”116
However, these “criticisms” were not reproduced, referenced or
attributed. Nevertheless, the Court followed suit and decided that
although in Delcourt the AG was not considered an adversary to
the applicant, the intervening evolution of the Court’s case law in
respect of appearances meant that the AG must now be considered
an adversary.117 This volte face was brought about on the basis of
no evidence whatever and this despite the ECtHR’s own frequent
references in previous cases to the importance of objectivity and its
insistence on retaining an objective element in the assessment of
appearances.
Thus an important new aspect of Article 6
jurisprudence seems to have been based on no more than the
subjective perceptions of the Commission and the Court.
In fact there was some evidence on public attitudes towards
legal systems in Europe generally, and in Belgium in particular,118
that the court could have had recourse to, even in 1993 (though
admittedly, public attitudes were surveyed more generally and did
not cover precisely the issue of appearances).119
B. Efficiency, Effectiveness and Fairness: The Van de Walle
studies
Appendix 2 of the 2008 report summarizes data collected
116
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Id. at ¶ 26.
118
However, most of the detailed social research on attitudes to the law in
Belgium is more recent, largely as a result of the scandal surrounding the
prosecution of the pedophile Marc Dutroux. See HUBERT BOCKEN,
INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW 18–19 (2000). In fact, such was the public
disquiet over the handling of this case that the UN Economic and Social Council
Commission on Human Rights commissioned a Special Rapporteur to
investigate the Belgian system of judicial appointments. See Special Rapporteur
on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Eur. Comm’n H.R., U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.3 (Feb. 16, 1998) (by Param Cumaraswamy); In TAKING
FRENCH FEMINISM TO THE STREETS: FADELA AMARA AND THE RISE OF NI PUTES
NI SOUMISES 124 (Brittany Murray & Diane Perpic, eds., 2011), the authors
describe how the public demonstrations triggered by the Dutroux scandal led
the Belgian government to propose numerous reforms to the justice system.
119
See STEVEN VAN DE WALLE & JOHN W. RAINE, EXPLAINING ATTITUDES
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intermittently from 1981 to 2000 from the World Values Survey on
confidence in the justice system.120 This shows that there was
indeed a decline in confidence in some countries (including
Belgium, Finland, France, the UK, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) between 1981 and 2000.121 The
same report summarises data from the Eurobarometer survey from
autumn 1997 to spring 2006 showing that, with the possible
exception of Belgium, where figures improved considerably in this
period, possibly due to reforms in the criminal justice system
implemented in response to the Dutroux affair, the percentage of
respondents who “tend to trust” the legal system has remained
relatively constant.122
However, Van de Walle and Raine’s survey concludes that
there are no universal findings across all jurisdictions studied and
the general patterns that do emerge are almost exclusively related
to the criminal justice system. 123 A fairly consistent pattern
emerged in “general survey[s] on government and politics [where]
. . . opinions may reflect attitudes towards government and
institutions in general, or even personal contentment or life
satisfaction, rather than attitudes specifically about the justice
system.”124
This suggests that the justice system itself may not be
viewed independently of wider governmental and political
concerns, though the authors point out that the relation is not
necessarily causal.125 Moreover, where surveys have examined the
justice system specifically, they tend to be poor at offering
explanations for attitudes because they usually fail to take
sufficient account of social and personal stances among
respondents. 126 From our point of view the most interesting
conclusions from the report concern the need for care in both
120

Van de Walle & Raine, supra note 119, at 59.
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research design and in the interpretation of results.
“overarching message,” they claim:

The

is that survey research on the justice system needs to be
carefully organised along distinctive lines. General surveys
are unlikely to be particularly useful for detecting and
designing specific operational improvements. The attitudinal
data they generate are likely to be embedded in more general
perceptions about government and public institutions, and are
therefore unlikely to reveal much about the specific reasons
for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the justice system.127

This suggests that even if the Borgers majority had
consulted general surveys on attitudes to the judicial process
before reaching their conclusions (which they probably did not),
their assumption that public sensitivities could be addressed or
assuaged by widening the scope of the “doctrine of appearances”
in the way that Judge Martens found so objectionable was oversimplistic.128
Of particular importance is the extent to which popular
attitudes to the justice system (especially the criminal justice
system) might be said to be affected by personal experience. Van
de Walle and Raine’s report touched on this only briefly,129 but
more recently Van de Walle has undertaken a more extensive study
based on a subset of the 2005/6 British Crime Survey and
specifically designed to test the theory that at least in the context of
the Criminal Justice System (CJS) the assessments of stakeholders
are enhanced by experience.130 His review of the earlier studies
revealed a mixed picture with no direct link established between
experience of the system and views on its efficiency, effectiveness
and fairness. 131 The clearest correlation seemed to be with
perceptions of political and governmental institutions generally,
127
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such that the CJS as a whole became “tarred with the same brush”
regardless of its actual performance, a finding consistent with Van
de Walle’s and Raine’s earlier work discussed above. In other
words, general contentment with society seemed to color
respondents’ views, particularly where respondents had no direct
experience of the system themselves. However, contrary to
expectations, studies of those who had experienced the CJS did not
suggest that their perceptions were necessarily improved as a
result, a finding which undermined the assumption sometimes
made that negative perceptions of the system originated in
ignorance and that greater knowledge of the system enhanced
positive perceptions.132 Some studies in Canada and France had
suggested a correlation between experience and enhanced
perceptions of the system’s fairness but this was not the case for its
efficiency or effectiveness.133 On the other hand studies in the
United States suggested that exposure to the system tended to
produce the opposite result.134
Many of these earlier studies did suggest that experience
could have a polarizing effect, in the sense that respondents tended
to have a stronger positive or negative attitude, compared to the
more neutral views of those without experience but there was no
consistent pattern regarding changes in approval rates.135 Van de
Walle’s more recent study attempted to address the effect of
experience more directly. 136 He used the criteria of fairness,
effectiveness and efficiency among users of the system drawn from
those who had: (i) worked in the CJS; (ii) been the accused; (iii)
been a juror; or, (iv) been in court during a criminal case.137 His
findings indicated that for those other than the accused, experience
of the system tended to enhance confidence in the fairness of the
system but not in its effectiveness or efficiency, a result that was
132
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similar to the French and Canadian experiences:138
experience with the CJS generally appears to have a positive
effect on evaluations of fairness of the system, apart from
when the respondent has ever been the accused or the
defendant. Evaluations of the efficiency of the system are more
negative if a respondent has ever been in court during a
criminal case or when one has been the defendant, and, more
worrying, if one works, or has worked for, the CJS.
Evaluations of effectiveness are more negative among those
respondents who have ever been in court during a criminal
case, or who have been a defendant.139

Bearing in mind the limitations of the study, in so far as it
confirms the earlier findings that, defendants apart, issues of
fairness matter less than efficiency or effectiveness, there is little
support to be found here for the ECtHR’s priorities. To the extent
that there is a “public sensitivity” or specific concern with aspects
of the justice system, as opposed to a generalized disaffection with
social institutions generally, it seems that a continuing refinement
of the “doctrine of appearances” may not in fact have any
significant impact among those with no experience of legal
proceedings, and may be missing the point for those who do. We
turn now to research dealing with the specific issue of “subject
perspective,” i.e. the point of view of the citizen participant in
judicial process.
C. Dignitary Values versus Outcomes: The Tyler Studies
Some of the largest and most comprehensive empirical
studies in this area have been undertaken in the United States by
Professor Tom R. Tyler and his colleagues.140 Tyler’s studies have
138
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examined perceptions of fairness and the components of those
perceptions in a range of adversarial and non-adversarial social
situations including assessments of people exposed to judicial
procedures of various sorts.141 His conclusions suggest that the
cognitive processes of assessing fairness in these situations are
more sophisticated and complex than was previously thought and
certainly more so than the current “appearance jurisprudence” of
the ECtHR suggests. In his studies of reactions to treatment by
police officers and judges,142 Tyler found that:
[s]ome people interviewed indicated that police officers and
judges were acting in a non-neutral, biased way, yet
nonetheless evaluated those authorities to be fair. People
seemed willing to forgive surface features … if they felt that
the authorities were basically motivated to act in a benevolent
manner.143

Benevolence, for Tyler and Degoey, equates to the
“trustworthiness of the intentions of the authorities” involved in
dispute resolution, but in their analysis, what is important here is
the extent to which that trust is instrumental, i.e. related to the
expectation that an authority will deliver a favourable outcome, or
relational, i.e. reliant on the nature of the social interaction and
sense of identity between the authority and the recipient of the
decision.144 They reach the conclusion that trust in authorities and
a willingness to accept the legitimacy of their decisions is more
closely linked to the latter than former; an authority that treats a
group with “deference, neutrality . . . and dignity” is more likely to
be trusted than one that does not and, more importantly, is more
likely to have its decisions accepted.145 By contrast, an authority
which does not exhibit these relational features will be less trusted
141
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even when there is a perception that its decisions might be more
favourable.146
Importantly, Tyler and Degoey conclude that when it
comes to the “complex cognitive task” of attributing benevolence/
trustworthiness to judicial procedures, 147
people tend to engage in this complicated task, even when
they could rely on surface features such as neutrality or bias.
People seem to value information about benevolent intentions
enough to be willing to undergo extra cognitive efforts to
obtain them.148

In other words, their evidence suggests that their respondents not
only made a functional distinction between procedures and
outcomes but, in terms of importance, they prioritized the former
over the latter so that a poor outcome in a particular instance may
not necessarily adversely affect a person’s views on the
benevolence/ trustworthiness of that authority. These conclusions
are borne out by Tyler’s subsequent study directed to the specific
issue of legitimacy:
People’s views about the legitimacy of legal authorities are
more strongly insulated than performance values are from the
influence of good or bad experience … and … experience did
not overwhelm prior views.149

The understanding that procedure can shape the parties’ beliefs
about the distributive (and not merely procedural) fairness of the
outcome was not new. In 1981, Professor Jerry L. Mashaw called
for a reorientation of administrative “due process” values,150 in
what he called “dignitary terms,” so-called because they would
146

Id. at 334.
Id. at 336.
148
Id. at 336–37.
149
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 109, at 94–95.
150
A reference to the “Due Process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution which determines the constitutionality of state governmental
procedures.
147

152

ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
& COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 3, No. 2

demonstrate concern for and be reflective of “values inherent in or
intrinsic to our common humanity—values such as autonomy, selfrespect, or equality,” values which “ preserve and enhance human
dignity and self-respect.”151
Mashaw’s work was influenced by the findings of social
psychologist John Thibaut in association with his colleague W.
Laurens Walker whose experiments suggested that even for
participants disappointed in terms of outcomes, the way in which
they had been treated influenced their perceptions of substantive
fairness. 152 “The unifying thread in [the] literature,” Mashaw
concluded, “is the perception that the effects of process on
participants, not just the rationality of substantive results, must be
considered in judging the legitimacy of public decisionmaking.”153
The insight that, in Walker and Thibaut’s terms, “at least
with respect to perceptions, ‘ends’ (distributive justice) cannot
justify ‘means’ (procedural justice), but ‘means’ can indeed justify
‘ends’ to the extent that for participants, the perception of
procedural justice partially determines the perception of
distributive justice, has implications for a “subjective perspective”
norm of adjudicative procedure, of the kind that the ECtHR
appears to be developing in the context of its “equality of arms
appearance jurisprudence” if we might so term it. Should the
ECtHR choose to justify itself in these terms it will have to counter
the criticism of Professor D.J. Galligan that the research
conclusions reflect a conceptual model that is fundamentally
flawed. 154 The purpose of procedure, argues Galligan, is to
facilitate the production of good, in the sense of accurate,
151
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outcomes (“rectitude” in Benthamite terms).155 On this basis, any
assessment of accuracy in decision-making must begin from the
proposition that fairness “rests on the general principle that a
person is treated fairly if he is treated in a way to which he has a
justifiable claim.”156 The purpose of procedures is to guarantee not
only that the legal standards are properly applied but that people
will be treated in accordance with their normative expectations so
that the link between procedures and outcomes is necessary to an
overall account of the purpose of procedural norms; a mistaken
decision which produces an incorrect outcome constitutes a denial
of a valid claim and thus an injustice.157 Thus, although we can
concede that procedural rules relating to judicial neutrality, the
right to a hearing and equality of arms may have a “dignitary” or
“expressive” value in terms of the respect due to individuals in a
liberal democracy, 158 they should nevertheless be regarded as
primarily instrumental in character because they are immediately
directed towards the production of good outcomes:
Bias on the part of the decision-maker is condemned because
of the threat it poses to an accurate outcome, while a hearing is
important because it is likely to provide relevant and often
vital information and to reveal a side of the story which would
otherwise remain untold. The combined effect of such
procedural standards is the likelihood of their leading to a
more accurate outcome.159

An “appearance” test can certainly be defended by
reference to the need to maintain public confidence in the integrity
of legal process but “[c]onfidence that the law has been properly
applied [ . . . ] depends to a significant degree on confidence in the
155
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procedures as a means to those outcomes,”160 and “confidence in
the result is bolstered by employing procedures which reduce as
far as possible the risks of error.”161 On this basis, the conclusion
that concern with procedural fairness can be separated from
concern with the quality of outcomes is not only “implausible” but
“beyond credulity” because no real participant would be concerned
with the process to the exclusion of the outcome of the
proceedings in question. 162 No claimant denied a proper
determination of his claim would “praise the fairness of the
proceedings as the main point of interest.”163 Tyler’s research,
claims Galligan,
is based on distinguishing between normative standards
relating to procedures and outcomes respectively; having made
that distinction, he then proceeds to show empirically that the
standards relating to procedures dictate whether the process is
fair.164

The theoretical model has assumed the distinction it set out
to prove.
D. A Non-Empirical Basis for “Appearances Norms”?
These limitations in the existing research notwithstanding,
in their traditional formulations, the requirements of “appearance
jurisprudence” rest upon claims that are empirically verifiable;
courts must guard against an appearance of impropriety lest they
undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system
upon which its legitimacy rests. Nevertheless, as we suggested
earlier, courts do not normally test these assumptions empirically.
Whether or not they should is a matter to which we return shortly.
For the present, we comment that from this point of view, in its
160
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original formulations the “appearance jurisprudence” of the
European Court despite its idiosyncratic terminology is not
necessarily remarkable. The subsequent formulations, however,
specifically the requirement in “equality of arms” cases, that
appearances be judged from the point of view of the citizen
participant in judicial process—or, as we have termed it, a “subject
perspective,” are much more problematic. Although the views of
the “subject” of judicial process are certainly capable of
verification—the subject need only be asked—the Court to date
does not appear to take this path but continues to ground its
concerns on the assertion of a generalized need to assuage public
sensitivities. We suggest that a possible explanation here is that the
Court instinctively feels a need to demonstrate respect for Professor
Mashaw’s “dignitary values” or to put it another way, is motivated
by a desire to demonstrate its commitment to a principle of equal
concern and respect.
As Professor Hellman has suggested, it is possible to
articulate a normative theory of what we have termed “appearance
jurisprudence” that is not directed towards the harms that they seek
to prevent, and thus does not depend upon contestable empirical
claims. 165 In her account, a duty to avoid an appearance of
impropriety can arise independently of any issue of possible or
probable consequences by virtue of the nature of the relationship
between judge and judged.166 The duty arises because there is an
“epistemic imbalance” in the nature of the common enterprise with
which they are engaged; whilst the judge is able to assure herself
that the decision-making process will be carried out in a proper
manner, the “subject” towards whom the judicial process is
directed is not.167 This means that
the obligation of the judge to take care to provide the
appearance of justice to the parties whose case he adjudicates
grows out of the nature of his relationship with them. The
165
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limitations under which they operate, in particular their
inability to know the reasons that truly guide his decisionmaking, obligates him to attempt to appear unbiased as well as
actually to be unbiased. This is not simply because the power
of the judiciary will otherwise be eroded, but also because the
judge's relationship to the particular parties before him
requires him to avoid giving them a reason to distrust his good
faith.168

Our point is this: if this is the ethical basis of the Borgers’
requirements to take account of what we have here termed a
“subject perspective,” then in empirical terms the Court is “off the
hook,” but equally the Court should not fear to make this clear. A
‘respect agenda,’ in these terms, is not likely to be misunderstood.
Professor Mashaw put it this way:
[T]here seems to be something to the intuition that process
itself matters. We do distinguish between losing and being
treated unfairly. And, however fuzzy our articulation of the
process characteristics that yield a sense of unfairness, it is
commonplace for us to describe process affronts as somehow
related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being
taken seriously as persons.169

Our next point follows. A desire to ground “appearance
jurisprudence” in non-consequentialist terms does not dispose of
questions concerning their empirical effect. Commenting on the
reform of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professors
Chemerinsky and Friedman warned that judges who largely
control the rule-making process “may overvalue anecdotes and
opinions about reform and be insufficiently attentive both to social
science process and to the needs of court users.”170 Professor
Koppel makes the same point; procedural rules serve normative
ends but when normative choices are not underpinned by empirical
168
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information, the danger is that the “knowledge vacuum” that
ensues will be filled by “anecdotes and political rhetoric.” 171 If
the Court’s “appearance jurisprudence” is not to be regarded in
this light, the connection with life as it is “on the ground”—as
opposed to how it may be intuited from the Court bench should not
be ignored. There is clearly room for specific and targeted
empirical research into the root causes of public attitudes to justice
and the application of those findings in judgments relating to
Article 6.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested elsewhere the connection between the
ECtHR’s “appearance jurisprudence” and the tropes of more
familiar formulations of fair process which struggle to balance the
requirements for delivering outcomes that are timely, efficient, and
accurate with standards of participation and neutrality that are both
broad enough to inspire confidence but also sufficiently tightly
drawn to preclude ill-founded and frivolous litigation.172 In the
context of the redrafting of the American Bar Association’s
Judicial Code, Ronald Rotunda has pointed out that when the
courts get the balance wrong there are consequences in terms of
costs which extend beyond the financial:
We sometimes think, loosely, that ethics is good and that
therefore more is better than less. But more is not better than
less, if the “more” exacts higher costs, measured in terms of
vague rules that impose unnecessary and excessive burdens.
Overly-vague ethics rules impose costs on the judicial system
and the litigants, which we should consider when determining
whether to impose ill-defined and indefinite ethics
prohibitions on judges.
Unnecessarily imprecise ethics rules allow and tempt
171
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critics, with minimum effort, to levy a plausible and serious
charge that the judge has violated the ethics rules. Overuse not
only invites abuse with frivolous charges that have the patina
of legitimacy, but also may eventually demean the seriousness
of a charge of being unethical.173

There are obvious dangers for the authority of the judicial
process from an excessive concern with appearances. Firstly, as
pointed out earlier, addressing this concern may not actually make
much difference to public perception or it may be addressing an
aspect of the process that is not the primary concern of the public.
Secondly, such concerns may become self-fulfilling to the extent
that suspicion and “increased sensitivity” in the minds of the public
arises because the judiciary itself raises the suggestion that the
process might be flawed.174 Third, and in this context, possibly
most importantly, the effect of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence of
appearances has been to require modifications to the legal
procedures of member states despite the fact that in Belgium at
least, and elsewhere by implication these have never “been put in
question by the legal profession or public opinion.”175 If the effect
of emphasizing the “subject perspective” of citizens on the
receiving end of adjudicative procedures is to require adjustments
to the judicial systems of the contracting states with the all too
predictable consequence of fuelling the appeal opportunities of
human rights lawyers, the delays and inefficiencies likely to result
173
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may themselves give rise to a public perception of ineptitude and
inefficiency that is all too real.
From this perspective it is tempting to dismiss the Court’s
“appearance jurisprudence” as yet another manifestation of an
increasingly federal behavior by which the Court seeks to impose
models of process on the member states of the Council of Europe
but which as Lord Hoffmann suggested, has no mandate in the
Court’s founding legal instruments.176 Lord Hoffman’s critique
has particular resonance in the context of Article 6:
Because for example, there is a human right to a fair trial, it
does not follow that all the countries of the Council of Europe
must have the same trial procedure. Criminal procedures in
different countries may differ widely without any of them
being unfair. Likewise the application of many human rights
in a concrete case, the trade-offs which must be made between
individual rights and effective government, or between the
rights of one individual and another, will frequently vary from
country to country, depending on the local circumstances and
legal tradition.177

In Martinie v. France, Judge Costa, joined by Judges
Caflisch and Jungwiert in dissent, made the same point:
We contest the very presuppositions of the Borgers decision
and therefore those of its epigones. Appearances are certainly
important, but less so than what Freud and others have called
the reality principle and in any event than reality in the strict
sense of the term. That the public are increasingly sensitive to
the guarantees of fair justice is both evident and desirable.
How, though, does the quality of justice depend on the
position of “State Counsel” in the proceedings before the
Court of Audit or on the fact that the Government
Commissioner takes part in, or is merely present at, the
deliberations of the Conseil d’Etat? In our view, public
sensitivity should not be confused with the fantasies harboured
176
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by the occasional litigant or the arguments advanced by
certain lawyers.
8. We take particular issue with the illogical and dangerous
developments in the case-law. It is illogical to afford the States
a margin of appreciation, or even a wide margin of
appreciation (which derives from the subsidiarity principle and
recognises national traditions) where entirely essential rights
and liberties are concerned and to attempt to erase often old
and respected national traditions in favour of abstract
procedural uniformity, which – imperceptibly – reduces the
margin of appreciation to nought ... Beyond the present
judgment and the courts in question here, it is illogical and
dangerous to bend the Contracting States and their supreme
courts to procedural rules that are made uniform down to the
last detail when there are better things to be done regarding
European supervision of respect for the rights guaranteed by
the Convention. It is better to accept certain national judicial
features and concentrate on harmonising the guarantees which
States must provide in respect of substantive rights and
liberties: the necessary dialogue between judges will, we
think, be greatly facilitated by this, in the interests of all,
domestic courts and European Court alike, and will promote
justice that is truly “fair”.178

We very respectfully agree.
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